THE NEW IDEAL.

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THE MAN JESUS.

[A POSTHUMOUS DISCOURSE.]

A VERY wonderful life was lived in Judea a little more than 1800 years ago. The Christian world that claims orthodoxy believes it was a god-life. If a god-life it was incapable of human assimilation. We believe it was a human life. If it was the life of a man men can understand it and assimilate it. If I believed that Jesus was in very truth a god I could not speak to you to-day making him the theme of thought, but only a theme to kindle emotion. This I wish to avoid, and to address only your most unimpassioned reason.

Prof. Gray once said to me that the advent of Darwin cut the history of botany into two sections, pre-Darwinian and post-Darwinian. It is not possible for a botanist now to think of a plant as the pre-Darwinian may have thought. In a larger sense the doctrine of Evolution has cut the history of thought into two sections. We cannot think on any great subject, or think of any great man, as our fathers in the past generation may have thought. If Cuvier had lived in this generation he would not have called Aristotle a miracle. Before geology was a science, a man might have given credence to a report that in the chain of the Rocky Mountains is one dome lifted immeasurably above all others. Geology came, teaching the dynamics of mountain-making, and now we know that what we find in Colorado, — a multitude of lofty domes and peaks, but not a peak or dome transcending others by more than a hundred feet,— is an ordinance of Nature. In the crumpling and folding of human strata, domes of thought and character rise, but no man will greatly transcend all other men.

Men have regarded Jesus from three points of view:

First. He was supernatural. He was God. This is orthodoxy.

Second. He was not God, but he was the one supreme man. He was a vast mountain-dome transcending all others in the chain. This is orthodox Unitarianism.

Third. He was a Hebrew, and he developed under such conditions as are implied in race, language, country and times. This is Rationalism. This is the Unitarianism of Parker.

Now, the man never lived who was not under such limitations as came from birth and environment. "Socrates of Jerusalem"; — "Jesus of Athens"; — if that were the reading, can anyone suppose we would have the same Memorabilia and the same New Testament? Jesus was as much the fruitage of the Hebrew cult as Socrates of the Greek. No student of Jesus can understand him except through such preliminary study as that to which I ask your attention now. One of the oldest and most strongly marked races of men was the Semitic. The line of our race, carried backward, would unite with that of the Jew far beyond the horizon of history, or even the twilight of fable. We can think the thoughts of the early Hindu, but we cannot well project ourselves into the heart-life, or mind-life, of the early Semite. Let us make the attempt. We have a language, on three stems, *k, t, l.* We cannot write the sound of a vowel. We have very few words. For all the multitudinous forms of fish-life we have only one name, *daag.* For the six thousand forms of feathered life we have only six names. For the whole animal kingdom we have only sixty-two names. For the entire world of life, plant and animal — all organic nature — we have only a hundred and twenty names. We have no name for an elephant, a cat, a domestic bird, and consequently we have no knowledge of elephants, cats, or poultry. We have no word for an apple, pear, peach, orange, lemon, cherry, or berry, for we have never seen them. We have no word for a game, for we never played. We have no word for a toy, for our children have no playthings. How our life shrivels on the human and Nature-side! See how it expands on the side which opens to the *ultra*-human and *super*-natural! Our language is rooted in supernaturalism. It is a ceaseless conjugation of the word "God." If a son is born to us we call him Aljada, "God is wise." If a daughter is born to us we call her Elisheba, "God is cursing." While we say of other men, "God is not in all their thoughts," we can say of ourselves, "God *is* in all our thoughts." Our life is an intoxication of God. To us there is no natural,— all is miracle. We believe that in Egypt rods became snakes, and snakes lapsed into rods; that the Nile, smitten by a rod, became blood; that a rod, pointed toward the Nile and lakes of blood, quickened them into frogs; that the same rod, smiting the dust, transformed it into lice; that Jahweh, our tribe-god, killed all the domestic animals one day with murrain, and killed them over

again the next day with blains, and killed them again the next day with hail; that Aaron's rod, having worked up all the available material in Egypt into frogs, the magicians immediately worked it up again into frogs; that Aaron's rod, having changed all the waters of Egypt into blood, the Egyptians at once changed them again into blood; that David, having killed Goliath very thoroughly with a sling and sword, Elhanan, the son of Jaare Oregim, killed him again.

Can we project ourselves into that old life of a race alien to our own and think their thoughts? Not well; our mental kinship is too remote. With no belief in immortality they were overwhelmingly religious. With no thought of the one infinite Unseen, they served with bloody rites a non-spiritual tribe-god. With the most narrow range of knowledge they had the most intense bigotry. Badges of hate were different shades of belief. The prophet hated the priest, the priest hated the prophet. Prophets hated each other. They were cruel and pitiless. David did not forfeit his rank as a man after the heart of Jahweh by sawing asunder or roasting to death the captives he had taken in war, or by his dying charge to Solomon to serve Jahweh and assasinate Joab and Shimei.

The development of the Semitic race was abnormal. The natural unfoldment of the human mind is from polytheism, the gods being nature-gods, to monotheism, the god being one infinite nature-god; from monotheism to skepticism; from skepticism to atheism; from atheism to pantheism; from pantheism to a form of theism still veiled in mountain-heights of thought. The Aryan passed through these phases, and its most illuminated men are passing now through the last stage. If the Greek mind had attained to monotheism too soon, it would have aborted. If the Greek could have been converted to the religion of the Hebrew that marvelous genius would never have flowered out into art and eloquence and song and philosophy and science. It is true that the religion of Israel was not monotheism as we are monotheistic. Solomon's temple was a pantheon of ghost-gods, not nature-gods. Hebrews before the captivity held to a ghost-form of polytheism. Yahweh was simply one god among many other gods. Saul called one of his sons Ish-baal, meaning Baal's man,— implying that this son was devoted to the service of Baal. David called one of his sons Baaljada,— the name signifying that Baal is the wise god. It is a fact worthy of note, a fact which commentators have been careful not to point out, that after the captivity, when Jahweh had come to be more exclusively the tribe-god, writers doctored the older records. They changed the name of Saul's son, as recorded in Kings, and

wrote it in Chronicles, *Ishbosheth*. They changed the name of David's son from Baaljada to *Aljada*, which means "God knows." Finally, as in the time of the later Daniel, they began to drop the name Jahweh, as if ashamed of his record, and write the word *Master*. Redactors went through the Psalms, and where they found the word Jahweh they erased it, and wrote the name of the god, *Elohim*. Then the Jews of the Dispersion, living chiefly in Alexandria, having lost their race-language, translated their sacred books into Greek, and suppressed completely the god Jahweh. The name of this awful god of ancient Israel nowhere appears in the Septuagint. It passed, though not through Jesus, into Christianity.

"Before Jehovah's awful throne,"—

an awful hymn. Let us hope to see the last vestige of Jahweh-worship fade from Christianity, as not a vestige of it was in the mind of Jesus.

These are the bold outlines of Israel's mental traits and religious development. Many years before the birth of Jesus the nation lost its autonomy. Prophets cried to Jahweh, and thundered back to the people the oracles of Jahweh. Jeremiah uttered an oracle of comfort. He prophesied a return of the Jews from captivity in Babylon, after seventy years of service. He prophesied an era of unspeakable blessing to a people restored to their father-land. Captive kings would serve them. Jahweh would no longer whet his glittering sword against *them*. Peace would be in all their borders. They would put on the spirit of joy for the garment of heaviness.

Now a portion of the Jews did return to Jerusalem after fifty years of servitude (the prophet missed it by twenty years). But what did they find? Jeremiah's oracle realized? They found hyenas prowling through the ruins of the temple and of the homes their fathers had built. They found Palestine infested with wild beasts and slipping back to the wildness of Nature. Homeless, they began to build themselves homes. The poor, unsheltered wretches were smitten with pestilence, and then the oracle of Jahweh was thundered again into their ears by Zephaniah. Jahweh had again seized his glittering sword, and was at them again because they were building their own houses before they built *his* house! Time passed — a heavy time to this remnant of Israel. Disaster followed disaster. No people on earth was ever more wretched. Where were the captive kings who were to serve them? Time passed and brought a dreamer known to us under the name of Daniel. He brooded over the oracle of Jeremiah. Things had not turned out as predicted. But the oracle *must* be infallible, and therefore when Jeremiah said seventy years, he did not

mean seventy years. Daniel was the first commentator. He warped the words of Jeremiah, and put on them a meaning entirely foreign to the mind of the prophet. On the basis of this oracle of Jeremiah he made an oracle of his own, foretelling the destruction of the world and the glories that would follow, when God himself, after the passing of the Babylonian, the Persian, the Greek, and the Roman powers, would set up a kingdom of his own in Judea, and rule in person. These predictions threw the Hebrew mind into a fever of expectancy. In such feverish dream was the nation when a child was born, in some one of the little hamlets of Palestine, to carpenter Joseph and his wife Mary. I have taken much of your time in this preliminary study. If I describe to you a reed of a summer's growth I need not go far down into the soil. If I describe to you a mighty oak, whose boughs have been lodgement for the singing birds of heaven for eighteen hundred years, and whose leafage has been shade to pilgrims, faint and foot-sore, bruised and thorned on the highways of life, I must trace its feeding-roots far out into the soil and its tap-root deep down into the earth.

Jesus was born of the Hebrew race fifty years after it had lost its language. Like other Hebrews he spoke Aramaic. He did not read Hebrew. His education was that of the Jewish youth around him. It consisted chiefly in memorizing long genealogical tables, as infructuous to the mind as memorizing a rope of sand. Plato constructs a dialogue between Socrates and an Athenian youth on *friendship*, to show how the youth of Athens were trained to precision and clearness in thinking. No school or teacher in Palestine ever taught a youth to think at all. The literature on which the mind of Jesus was formed was the Talmud, and such portions of the sacred books as he could learn orally in the synagogue. A portion of the Talmud was written in Aramaic, and this he could read. What was this literature? We have the Talmud to-day in fourteen heavy folio volumes, the most dreary literature ever written by stylus or pen. Dr. Lightfoot, who was the best Talmudic scholar of the age, says of these volumes, "The frightful roughness of the language and the amazing emptiness and sophistry of the matters handled, do torture, vex and tire him who reads them." No doubt they did vex, torture and tire Mary's son.

I said that he never read what is known by us as the Old Testament; for it was written in what for fifty years had been a dead language. In his day it was taught in the synagogue by oral translations into Aramaic. These translations were called "Targums," and they were not reduced to writing till after the final overthrow of Jerusalem. Jesus knew but little about the Patriarchs, or Moses,

or the prophets. When he reproved the Pharisees for not doing the works of Abraham, he did not intend to sanction works which would send any civilized man of to-day to the penitentiary — he did not know what had been recorded of the man Abraham. When he told the people to do as the Pharisees said, for they sat in Moses' seat, he little knew what spiritual and mental debauchery was enjoined in the name of Moses. The drapery of his thought was the mythology of his race. We find him saying, "As the days of Noe were," — "as in the days before the flood," — "as Jonas was three days in the whale's belly." As a Hebrew, he gave assent to the mythology of his race by force of blood. His assent, at times, was not unqualified. Paul would have us believe that Jesus broke with the past and threw off Judaism. But Paul never saw him. It is significant that all the disciples who followed him and attended most on his words continued strict Jews. James, his brother, served in the temple, performing bloody rites and persecuting Paul. If you will bear in mind our study of the Semitic race you will see what it was for a Semite to break with the mythology of his people. In Palestine the mind was asphyxiated. In Athens it breathed freely. The Athenian mind presented a thousand facets to the light of nature and life; the Hebrew only one. Plato could say, in Athens, that Homer should have have been publicly whipped in the streets for ascribing immoral actions to the gods. If Jesus had said, in Jerusalem, that Hosea should have been whipped in the temple for saying that Jahweh told him to commit adultery, or that Zachariah should have been put in the stocks for saying that Jahweh, to punish men in Jerusalem for making images, threatened to put out the eyes of all the horses in Palestine, his life would have been the penalty of his temerity. Jesus, intellectually, reflected his race, his education, and his times. He lived at a period when there was not, perhaps, in all Palestine, a man who had conceived of Nature as an orderly sequence of cause and effect. Consider what was the current talk even in the higher classes. When Herod heard of Jesus he said, "This is John the Baptist. He is risen from the dead." Others said it was Elias, who had risen. Others were not sure of the identity, but were sure it was some one of the old prophets — not, you will mark, a reincarnation, but a *resurrection*, bones, flesh, all. They seem to have talked about casting out devils, and of raising the dead, as we talk about the weather. If you were to read in a Memorabilia that Plato said of Socrates that he was Pythagoras, raised from the dead, you would say the passage is spurious, for the conception is utterly foreign to Greek thought. In the Memoirs of Jesus you find him saying that John, the Baptist, was Elias, whose bones had been dust nine hun-

dred years; and you do not challenge the passage, for the conception is consonant with Jewish thought.

Fatally for himself, and fatally and very sadly for multitudes in after-time who have taken his name, Jesus shared the delusion of his countrymen, and believed the dream of Daniel, founded on a guess of Jeremiah. With all the fervor of his soul he believed that the time of the prophecy had come, that the world was about to be destroyed, and that God was about to set up his own kingdom. This belief dominated his life. It made him indifferent to the life that now is. It vitiated his ethics. "Blessed are the poor." But no, poverty is not beatific. "Take no thought for to-morrow,"—"resist not evil,"—"turn the other cheek,"—"give him your cloak also." On such precepts we could never develop a firm moral fibre or a strong manhood.

The somber theology of his race made his pessimism colossal. This world was the devil's own. To seek good from it was to serve the devil. To get good from it was to get the devil's reward here and God's eternal hell hereafter. "Woe unto you, rich, for you have secured your consolation."

It is said that Jesus wept. We may well believe that he wept, for his was a tender soul, overflowing with love to men. He wept, and all men to-day who believe as he believed about Nature and human destiny should know nothing but to weep. You cannot read a mild meaning into those awful words, "These shall go away into everlasting torment, prepared for the devil and his angels;"—"outer darkness, where is weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth."

All that we have yet found in the man Jesus is a Hebrew, thinking the thoughts of an intense Hebrew in the first century of our era. We have not reached his secret. It certainly was not in powers of thought. He uttered no thoughts on the great questions of philosophy or science which have stirred the minds of men since men began to think. He uttered no thought about education, society, or government,—questions which concern *this* world; for he believed that this world was about to cease. His intellectual life was narrow.

We have not yet reached his secret. Let us look a little further.

He knew not Jahweh, the god of Israel. On the cross he addressed God under the name of "Helo," but his name at other times was the "Father." "No man hath at any time seen the Father"—this was not in the vein of him who wrote the book of Exodus. "The kingdom of heaven is within you"—this is as far from Moses as pole from pole. "Blessed are the pure in heart"—in this he was

separated by arcs of celestial space from David and Solomon and Hosea. "The hour cometh, and now is, when ye shall neither in this mountain nor yet at Jerusalem worship the Father; but the true worshiper shall worship in spirit and in truth"— spoken to a Samaritan woman on the curb of Jacob's well, this was the highest religious thought ever uttered by the lips of man. Yet the pinions which bore him up to the celestial blue where, above all limitations of race and time, he formulated the absolute religion, struck at once on the lower air, and he added, "Salvation is of the Jews." I wish it could be made to appear that these last words were not his.

We are finding his secret. In what lonely isolation he stands out now from his race and his times! Unknown to him is the tribal god of his fathers. Within him, around him, is the unseen Father. No stretched-out hand over Egyptian waters, no quaking and smoking Sinai, no rain of fire on Sodom, no theophany of a robed form on a throne, high and lifted up, with overarching wings of cherubim, and with train filling the temple, taught him that God is. No dream, no trance, no vision of the night, no ghostly visitant, taught him that man continues after the body has ceased. No prophet was he, no seer, but a great, normal, human soul, declaring God from a healthy mind to a race which had received its god from the abnormal mind of prophet and seer, and asserting the unending life to a people whose sacred books were as silent on the to-morrow of death as the tomb itself. What spiritual isolation was his! how cold! how drear! And this man, isolated from men, buffeted by men, could say, "Peace I leave with you, *my* peace I give unto you." What a man was this! Tempested on a fretted sea of bigotry, beat upon by every wind and wave of passion, no anchorage in that sweetest haven of rest called "*home*," held earthward by no sympathetic ties of blood, looking heavenward through no lens any human hand had shaped,— alone, alone as the dome of Chimborazo is alone on the azure deep over the Andes, he says to men, "*My* peace I give unto you."

> "Though round his feet the rolling clouds are spread,
> Eternal sunshine settles on his head."

He was not a Plato; he was not a great thinker; he was a colossal *character*. If he did not escape the intellectual vices of his race, he had no share in its moral obliquity. Every healthful human mind loves him. Every upward-looking soul finds him an inspiration. I am a Christian as I am a Platonist. I believe that Plato was the crowned thinker of humanity, but he fell into many grave errors. I believe that Jesus, on the God-ward side of his nature, was

the loftiest of men, but on the intellectual side he shared the limitations of his race and fell into grave errors.

It was inevitable that men should make him a God. In the first centuries of our era what men wanted most was a new variety of god. The human mind had grown weary of its gods. At heart men hated gods. When Helen was restored to the Greeks from Troy, and when she began to bewail the calamities her conjugal infidelity had brought on Greece, she was checked. "No," said the wronged husband,—"No, it is all the work of the gods." Men grew tired of this sort of god-work. In the Greek and Roman world the popular conception was that the gods wantonly afflicted men, or that they were indifferent to the sufferings of men. The Semitic race was no wiser. A prophet makes Jahweh say, "Is there evil in the land and I have not done it?" The writer of the second Psalm said that "He who sitteth in the heavens shall laugh. He shall speak to men in his wrath, and vex them in his sore displeasure." Men were "the sport and prey of wracking whirlwinds"—and of gods. An Iowa clergyman, whose mind is a survival from the Saurian age of humanity, calls a pit dug as a hiding-place from a cyclone, "a god-dodger," —a place where man would dodge the smiting hand of God. This preacher was thinking of the Jahweh who "bowed the heavens and came down, who rode on a thunder-cloud and flew, and shot forth on the wings of the wind." Talmage thought that God put it into the hoofs of Mrs. Mahaffey's cow to kick over a lamp and burn the city of Chicago. Talmage was thinking of Zeus, who sent an evil dream to Agamemnon, or of Jahweh as seen by the prophet Micaiah, sitting on his throne and sending a lying spirit down to plot the death of Ahab. When a man is maimed or killed by some other agent than man, lawyers write it in legal form, "Killed or maimed by the act of God." This, too, is survival from the Saurian age, when God was an Ichthyosaur, and the human race an ocean of defenseless fishes, trying to dodge his crushing jaws. The world was very wretched. Angels appear in the machinery of one of our dramas, and one angel being seen aside, weeping, another angel speaks: "Ah, that is the angel of the earth — she is *always* weeping." The world, under its gods, was very sad and wretched.

To understand well the human mind we must take it in the great aggregate, and see its outworkings through many generations. It wanted a turn of the tables. If the aggregate human mind could have formulated its thought, it might have written, "Wanted, a God suffering at the hands of men." The want was prophecy of such a God. The legend of Jesus grew. The Galilean became the

suffering God. The thoughts of men were fixed on his death, and not his life. A barbarous art came to the service of the new religion. Presentments of the crucified God appeared on canvas, in marble, in plaster, in clay, in wood. He is painted and chiseled and carved in every attitude and expression of agony. Every form of indignity is thrust upon him. If you travel in Catholic Europe you will see in every church, and along every highway, images of the God, smitten by hands of men, reviled, insulted, mocked, pricked in the brow by thorns, pierced in hands and feet by nails, bleeding, agonizing, dying, dead. The meaning of all this has never been expressed. It is the backward swing of a long pendulum.

If the aggregate human mind to-day could formulate its want, it might say, "Wanted, a warm, pulsing, sympathetic, helpful, *human* God." Beecher said, "God to me is a mist in the air. Jesus is the God I apprehend and love." He spoke for the average human mind — as he *was* the average human mind. Men, in the aggregate, do not invoke God or worship him. They invoke a man. It is no accident that in the Catholic Church invocation of Mary and the saints gradually displaced the worship of Jesus. He became too much a god. He was too far removed from man. I saw a letter from the Catholic bishop of California, addressed to the faithful, commanding them to pray against earthquakes. Whom were they to invoke? Not God, not Jesus, not Mary, but an obscure saint named Agatha. This saint would speak about it to Mary, and she to her son, and he to his father. Saints are lobbyists, at the court of heaven. Rome degraded Mary when it announced the dogma of her immaculate conception. The dogma pushed her a little farther up into godhood, a little farther away from humanity. As time passes she will be invoked less and less. And as time passes the Jesus of legend will disappear in the same nimbus as Jahweh; but the real Jesus will live forever in the hearts of men.

W. D. Gunning.

DARWIN, THE JOHN THE BAPTIST OF A NEW GOSPEL.

When Darwin died, England placed his remains with religious rites within the walls of the most venerable and sacred temple of her worship. Not without some misgiving; for it had not been the habit of that man to frequent the temples of conventional worship, and for all the weighty matters of personal salvation, when pressed upon his attention, he confessed a surprising indifference. There

were those near to as well as far from the spectacle, who felt not unlike the timid savages, when their converted chief, in full assembly, advanced and dealt with a club a blow full in the face of the wooden god before which he had been wont to grovel; and who expected the dishonored deity to resent the insult on the spot by swift and terrible punishment. There were many proper and respectable people, who expected that the old mediæval saints, long laid at rest in the storied abbey, would make some demonstrations of disgust at having their sacred privacy intruded upon by this reckless and profane worldling, who had so contemptuously treated all their solemn formulas. But, bold as the reclaimed idolater, England with the irresistible public sentiment of the modern world behind her, persisted in and completed the sacrilege, and the old idols gave no sign of resentment.

And was not England wiser even than she seemed? for no man has lived, since Jesus of Nazareth, who has done so much as Charles Darwin to make genuine and civilizing religion possible among men. It will be not the least due to him, if the dream of wise and holy men is ever realized on earth, when

> "Time will run back and fetch the age of gold,
> And speckled Vanity
> Will sicken soon and die;
> And leprous Sin will melt from earthly mold,
> And Hell itself will pass away,
> And leave her dolorous mansions to the peering day.
>
> "Yea, Truth and Justice then
> Will down return to men,
> Orbed in a rainbow; and, like glories wearing,
> Mercy will sit between,
> Thron'd in celestial sheen,
> With radiant feet the tissued clouds down-steering:
> And heaven, as at some festival,
> Will open wide the gates of her high palace-hall."

For what God has suffered from, and is still suffering from; what has driven away and silenced his worshipers, is the imputation he has long lain under of having made the bad world. That is not quite all. He must also be exonerated from the imputation of capriciously and cruelly governing the bad world, for which no other excuse has yet been found than that of doing evil that good may come, — an excuse we disallow in extenuating the misfeasances of fellow-creatures. Study and criticism, working simultaneously with scientific investigation, will meantime have vindicated him from the too-long believed charge of having written a bad book. This judgment by no means ignores the matchless excellencies of this revered work — it is precisely the criterion we apply to all other books, and,

for that matter, to all men. Byron's longest and most artistically complete poem is, by reason of a half-dozen base pictures, spite of its beauties, inexorably consigned to the *Index Expurgatorius* of all clean souls. We demand the blotting out of the life of Sawtelle; but he only killed his brother; there were millions of men he *did not kill*,— towards whom he might even have been kind and affectionate. So in this book there are pictures of an arbitrary, partial, capricious, cruel, ill-controlled deity, which hopelessly affront the idea of perfection in upright souls, and blur and deny and confuse the grander and, on the whole, more prevalent impressions.

The work, which they have to do, who regard religion as a nobler product of the human soul than science, art, industrial invention, the laws of the social order; who rely mainly upon its inspiring power to uplift humanity to the heights of its predestined achievements, is to make new bottles for the new wine,—to find a faith which, better than the old one, shall harmonize with and adopt the enlarged knowledge of man, and, what is of more moment than that, shall accord with the new tenderness, sympathy and charity, that have expanded the human heart. For the phenomenon that most interests the thoughtful man of this age is not so much the grandeur of the cosmos that science has opened to his contemplation, as the new conscientiousness, the depth and comprehensiveness of the benevolence, that, not content with putting the bad world in order, demands that his ideals of excellence shall be reflected in the heavens, and beam upon the serene countenance of God.

In the very degree in which it has been forced upon the intelligence of men that God is the central energy at the bottom of all phenomena, they have gradually, quietly, but universally dropped their personal relations with him. Having defined him as the *Great Unknowable*, they thereafterwards severely let him alone,—and worship, adoration, love, piety, thenceforth, in the ascendancy of such ideas, became impossible.

It was in vain for the deity to protest, as he does all through the Old Testament, that he is merciful and long-suffering, and pitieth them who fear him as a father pities his children; to asseverate, as he does in the New Testament, that his nature is love, and that men, by loving, become divine. There he was, *caught in the fact*, as it were, of making a universe which is, for the most part, a theatre of cruelty and suffering—creating in reckless profusion living things, each endowed with a passion for living and a horror of dying, and employing their vital powers in the occupation of painfully devouring and exterminating each other.

If the world is good,—and it must be if it is the manifestation of a good creator,—why have so many noble souls been possessed with the passion to make it better?

> "The world is out of joint;—oh, cursed spite,
> That ever I was born to set it right!"

If the divine order is established,—has always subsisted,—why do we pray, *Thy Kingdom come?* If the will of God is done in the cosmos, why do we look forward to a period, when the ideal of the heavenly state shall correspond with the real of the earthly state?

Several years ago I was told, in the house where it occurred, this story: An aged man, who had survived most of his family, had a housekeeper to care for his domestic concerns, while the only other member of the household was an intelligent cat. Family prayers, night and morning, were punctually maintained, and it was the habit of the cat, wherever she happened to be—in the garden, watching for birds, or in the cellar, listening for mice—to leave every pursuit, when prayer-time came, and plant herself reverently in her mistress' lap till the service was over. But she produced a family of kittens, and, these being considered superfluous, the old gentleman cancelled their cheap lives without taking the care to do it out of sight of the mother. From that time, whenever prayer-time came, the old cat, as soon as the bible was opened, deliberately walked out of doors, or down cellar, and could never afterwards, except by main force, be made a witness of the family devotions.

A not dissimilar spectacle offers itself to the humane eye in any contemplation of the methods of Nature that imputes them to a directing personal will. And the effect on man is precisely that apparent on a very small scale in the case of that old cat.

It is of no use to protest. Actions speak louder than words. Handsome is that handsome does. By their fruits ye shall know them. In maxims like these, of universal authority, the common sense asserts the directness and rigor of its ethical judgments. Philosophy and theology have always been aware of this predicament, and its logical consequences; and they have provided for it these two resources, thereby saving the reputation of God:

1. God did not make, does not maintain, the bad creatures, the defective arrangements, from which alone sin and suffering issue. There is a bad deity, loving and delighting in evil, constantly trying to thwart the divine goodness, and often succeeding.

2. God made all things good and gentle at first: there were no pestilences, no earthquakes, no cyclones; the

serpents and scorpions did not sting; the lions and tigers marched in orderly procession before Adam to be named, and walked away wagging their tails. But when man sinned and fell, he not only ruined his soul and poisoned with death all his posterity, but he depraved all the great and small beasts, and mixed in stormy confusion and wreck the fair harmony of the universe.

> "Earth felt the wound; and Nature from her seat,
> Sighing through all her works, gave signs of woe
> That all was lost."

If we could continue to believe either of these propositions, we could pray again. But profane men first began to treat Satan as a huge joke: he was a favorite figure in burlesque and allegory. And religious men, not foreseeing how questioning his personality was sure to react on the personality of God, at first got ashamed of him, then withdrew him from the prominent roles he had filled in the spectacular exhibitions of religion, and finally plumply denied his actuality.

Simultaneously, the carefully read history of mankind, as written in monuments, records, organic remains, and the geologic strata, disclosed no garden of Eden, no state of primitive innocence, order and goodness. On the contrary, it became quite certain that the progress, instead of being from order, gentleness, and perfection, had been from savagery and cruelty and worse suffering; that, bad as the world is, it is enormously improved from its pristine conditions, and that no age was less discreditable to the personal good-will, that might have caused it, than the very age we know. Indeed, it seems mathematically demonstrable that the cosmos, if not infinitely bad at the beginning, must have had a fraction of good in it infinitesimally small; for if it has been *bettering* from the first,— and that is the import of it exposed to our brief observation,— there has been an eternity during which things have been mending. How inconceivably imperfect must have been its first state!

When the imputation thus forefended came back with all the force of a recoil, the great multitude of dogmatists — into whose heads even surgery could not introduce new ideas, who go groping about like sleepy hens to find again the roosts from which they have been rudely shaken — did not see any incongruity between the new facts and the old theories,— and if there were any such incongruity, so much the worse for the new facts. But the less number, of keener intelligence and more sensitive conscience, did see the tremendous sweep of the implications.

In this crisis, Darwin virtually suggested: Perhaps the good God did not make the bad world; it was bad at the

start; and what the good God is doing — always in his quiet and characteristic way — is to make it over and make it better. And thus was opened the way for the relieved heart of humanity to go again to its father and gratefully receive the kisses of his restored love.

I do not mean that Darwin ever even dreamed of constructing a new philosophy, still less a new theology. Occupied and absorbed in his study of the ways of life, he simply disclosed what he discovered, without an implication or a generalization; but he gave a host of laws and facts which, rightly co-ordinated, as they ultimately will be, will yet give us a new heaven and a new earth, a restored father in heaven, and a consistent and rational religion, which shall embody our relations with him.

Geo. F. Talbot.

AGITATION NO CAUSE FOR ALARM.

The present widespread agitation on social and industrial conditions is a healthful symptom of forces at work which must lead to good results in the future. But this agitation brings to the surface so many crying evils of our times, so many hard sociologic problems apparently needing immediate solution, that men and women newly awakened to the gravity of the situation, as they begin to understand the diseases which infest the social organism, grow impatient to find some specific sociological medicine that promises to cure at once all the ills which society is heir to. In the case of bodily disease, such promises are never made by honest physicians, who understand that radical cure of deep-rooted disease takes time and skill; only quacks offer panaceas to take effect at once. The processes of healing, as of growth, accrue in orderly succession, and quack medicines are liable to relieve present pain at cost of future added misery. So with diseases of the social body. With the best intentions possible, here, there, and everywhere, would-be reformers offer this, that, and the other specific for our many social infirmities. Now it is Individualism, now Communism, and again Nationalism. But while the doctors disagree, the patient's symtoms get fully discussed and described, and, when the seat of the disease is discovered, the true remedy may be applied, whereupon the process of cure may set in.

While in the midst of one of these often-recurring waves of social agitation, we are apt to imagine — seeing the worst aspects of the evil brought to present view — that there was never any worse state of affairs. If we are among those who are impatient of the existence of wrongs

thought to be eradicable, we are prone to think our own times the worst of all times. But if, when the warm-hearted, impatient reformer finds himself in one of these pessimistic moods, he will "try back," and recall the progress made and the many social evils, as bad as anything in our own day, which have been done away with through years of persistent agitation even within our own century, he will feel more like praising than decrying the work of his own age.

Let us glance at a few of these reforms, so that we may understand the possibilities of success in the work yet before us. There are men and women living to-day who can remember when theft and forgery were punished by death, according to English law. There are some who can recall the pathetic ballads of half a century ago, reciting the wrongs of the chimney-sweeps,—ballads now completely passed from mind. Those who are familiar with the naval stories of Captain Maryatt will recognize the evils of the press-gang system, which less than a hundred years ago was a recognized institution, yet which the civilization of to-day would think barbarism. There is a strong outcry, voiced very lately in a symposium in the *Arena* magazine, against so-called "Child-Slavery." But what are the worst evils inflicted on the employed children of to-day, guarded by legal enactments and strong public sentiment, compared with the slavery of the babes of fifty years ago to their often brutal parents as well as employers, both of whom, the one under scriptural, and the other under legal protection, could whip and abuse the child-slaves in their charge without intervention by Humane Societies or legal statutes? The outrages which inspired such poems as "The Little Factory-Child," to be found in G. J. Holyoake's Miscellaneous Works, and Mrs. Browning's pathetic "Cry of the Children," are, thanks to the education of public sentiment, no longer possible. And although the poor debtor may be to-day, even in some States of our Union, arrested and imprisoned for failure to pay his debts, yet the wholesale and indiscriminate incarceration of such incapables as "the father of the Marshalsea," depicted in Dickens' "Little Dorritt," is no longer in harmony with public feeling, and such imprisonment seldom occurs, while the creditor who spitefully has recourse to any outgrown law in such matters is frowned upon and at once classed with the Shylocks of society. The battle-scarred Union "Veterans" of to-day, who were only liberty-loving "boys" in 1861, understand better than anyone else what was their chief impulse to enlistment after the storming of Fort Sumter in April, 1861. It was not so much defense of the "Union" as it was an answering thrill to "the battle-cry of Freedom" for an enslaved race. The sense of outrage of

the personal human rights of the voiceless black millions of the South nerved many a mother's darling and hero of girlish love to meet death bravely, so that the stain of human slavery should be wiped out from this republic forever.

One hundred years ago there were no societies "for the prevention of cruelty to animals," nor "for the protection of women and children"; no "Bureau of Justice" to present and insist on the claims of the impecunious or friendless; no order akin to the "Knights of Labor" to enforce the workingman's rights. Increasingly the rights of the laborer have been recognized, and his hours of labor lessened at the demand of public opinion, during the last fifty years. Once he and his little children worked without respite fourteen hours a day for the pittance that kept them alive. To-day he rightfully demands that eight hours out of the twenty-four be considered his just offering of toil toward his own and the common weal. He has wrested bit by bit, so far, from that which claimed it, time to sleep, time to eat, time for a very little recreation. Now, in these days when brain and thought are so necessary to our complex civilization, he finds he needs time *to think*, and he asks the idlers to fill up some of his hours by their working, and asks Capital to return some of his surplus earnings, stored in his employers' coffers.

In spite of the many woful wrongs seen everywhere in our social system; in spite of our almost hopeless distance from the goal of a perfected humanity, we need not grow hopeless of ultimate success in any necessary reform if we will but look around us and see what has been accomplished, what is being accomplished in so many differing departments of ethical reform. Temperance among the people is viewed in a far different light from what it was at the beginning of the century. Science is bringing its focus to bear on the problem of pauperism, and is already planning systems of self-help for the poor by which the evil may be relieved. It is not so long ago that a newspaper was considered a luxury out of the reach of the working-classes, save when several combined to subscribe for one in common, to be read in turn; but to-day, when the newspaper is a much greater power in civilization than then, there are few families so poor as to be without their daily or weekly paper, and even those few have plenty of opportunities for free access to those paid for by others. Everywhere libraries are open to the people in a munificent fashion altogether unknown until this age. Many living can recall when letter-writing was a luxury to be rarely indulged in because of the cost of postage, while communication by telegraph, telephone or cable was an undreamed-of possibility; when travel of a few hundred miles took more

days than it now takes hours to accomplish; when horses were the most available means of transit, and a trip across the ocean was undertaken with foreboding.

Using a single further valuable illustration, we need only point out the wonderful progress made in the widening of woman's sphere of occupation and education within the past twenty-five years, to evince the reasonableness of the hope that the present unsolved problems of our industrial and political systems will find peaceable answer, and all the various interests of men have an equitable adjustment, in due season. Assured of this, we all may well work together in patience, and unceasingly, toward that end.

Let us, without fear of the consequences, welcome the present earnest discussion of the economic and social evils of to-day, and be grateful for the inspiration which sent Edward Bellamy's beautiful dream into every household, to awaken even the unthinking to a consideration of questions which must be eventually met and solved by humanity, and which, by its vivid portrayal of present evils in contrast with his ideal State, has helped to spur men and women to thought and action which in time may bring about at least a better, even if not an ideal, state of society.

One great result already attained by this agitation of industrial problems has been the bringing together of capitalists and laboring-men in "Economic Conferences," to discuss temperately, pro and con, both sides of the subject. This great gain secured, may we not hope that without any especial arbitrary statutory enactments, there may be brought about such a pervasive education of public conscience as shall make those men who, by superior judgment or fortuitous circumstance or skill, may become possessed of more capital than is necessary for the use of themselves and their families, ashamed to do ought but turn it into channels where it may be used to uplift the less fortunate? We see, occasionally, evidence of such sense of responsibility to the community, in the gifts of Libraries, Industrial Institutes, etc., by direct gift or by bequest. And it would be better still if, instead of each man making such gifts or bequests at his own discretion, there should be established a common fund, made up of many such gifts, with a committee of the wisest political economists of the land to direct its outlay in such lines as should most quickly do good to the greatest number of needy and industrious people, the trustees being held to strict account, by the people at large, for every dollar received.

We are a long distance, perhaps, from the possibility of such an exhibition of cultivated public conscience as this; but the guide-boards begin to point that way.

Sara A. Underwood.

THE MAN IN THE STATE.

Only within the present decade has the agriculturist laborer of England taken a direct part in the composition of Parliament. But, through many pregnant centuries, the man's tone has been heard. It has pushed its way through tumbling dynasties, midst the ruins of baronial castles and the falling fortunes of kings and emperors, impelled by the irresistible laws of evolution. It has announced, with increasing force and fervor, one inevitable condition of national and individual growth to be the absolute, unqualified equality of individual human rights.

Much as this early recognition of the voice of the individual man may have been smothered by the usurpations of power during the succeeding centuries, it is a noteworthy fact that, long before the discovery of this continent within which representative government is supposed to have found its completest development, manhood, as the essential unit of the State, was finding place in the thoughts of the world's statesmen.

Long after this, the English corporation (evolved, as has been suggested, from the Roman Collegia, out of which, in time, as Professor Bryce, in his remarkable book on the American Commonwealth, has shown, was to arise first the Colonial government, then the State government, then the Federal government, each in its turn an outgrowth of the other) was to prefigure the *growth* as distinguished from the *drift* of a State. Here, in the new land, with a diversified climate and soil, untrammeled by questions of the relations of ancient sovereignties, freed from the dominion of the one man power, was to be formulated the first written constitution known to man. And singularly enough, it was to find its substantial prototype, not in the long line of its immediate ancestry, but in the polity of ancient Greece, where, long before the white-haired Goth had invaded and subdued the swarthy Roman, the assembly of the citizens determined important public questions, and was the ultimate tribunal of the governed. And stranger yet, it was to promulgate in solemn terms, in its new code, the same paradox which had then existed in the streets of Athens,— proclaiming, with one breath, the equality of all men before the law, and insisting, in the next, upon the degradation and enslavement of a substantial minority of mankind.

And now, may we not see that the State has evolved by the same processes and under the same conditions as those by means of which civilization itself has grown? One most important fact to be noted is, that the most signal advances made by civilization have taken place within the

present century. Dr. Strong, in his widely read book on our country, has said that, "any one as old as the nineteenth century has seen a very large proportion of all the progress in civilization made by the race." And Andrew Carnegie, in his glowing laudation of what he calls the "Triumphant Democracy," asserts that "a hundred years ago, agriculture was in little better condition all over the world than it was a thousand years before."

Taking, then, our American Commonwealth as, at its birth, expressing the highest type to which the State had then evolved, upon what shall we find its growth to have depended? Behind it lay the ancient oligarchies, and the so-called republics of Greece, the rise and temporary spread of Christianity, the darkness of the middle centuries, shrouding with obscurity all rights of man, all lights of learning, and all hopes of religion; the revival of brutal wars of conquest; age upon age of slaughtered human life, the masses held in slavery and ignorance; and at last the gradual dawning of an uplifting sense of the dignity of man. DeLolme had just given to the world his classic panegyric of the English government when the first President of our republic took the oath of office. "Liberty," said DeLolme, in his concluding chapter, "merely showed herself to the ingenious nations of antiquity who inhabited the South of Europe, and she has found six centuries necessary for the completion of her work." Yet when these glowing words were written, trial by personal contest had not been abolished, and no person accused of crime was allowed counsel in the English Courts.

Our republic, at its birth, stood in all essential respects for government by the governed. More nearly, then, perhaps, than at any time since, the wish of Thomas Carlyle was realized, and the individual citizen was weighed as well as counted; and to this end no single factor had more largely contributed than the town-meeting of New England. The one fundamental postulate upon which rested the theory of the State, at that time, may be said to be the right of personal representation. Prof. Stubbs has shown that, "as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century, the doctrine that the taxpayer should have a voice in the bestowal of the tax, was gaining ground, but it required five hundred years for its full recognition." Prof. Howard, in his recent book on the Local Constitutional History of the United States, has pointed out that "the revival of the primitive village community in the New England towns was a revival of organs and functions on the recurrence of the primitive environment," and that "the selectmen of the town were the lowest representative government"; and it is obvious that the moment our early communities began

to prosper and extend their conquest over nature, the act of government had to be delegated. Townsmen were therefore chosen in New Haven, as long ago as 1651, in order that, in the words of their quaint resolution, "the town meetings which spend the town much time, may not bee so often," and, ten years before, voting by proxy had been established in Massachusetts.

More than one hundred years thereafter, the first written constitution known to history, adopted by the people, was put in practice in Virginia; and thirteen years after this event, the Constitution under which we live, which Gladstone has pronounced one of the greatest products of the human intellect, went into effect as the express charter of the State. Representative governments, then, had made possible the founding of our own State; and this, the first of rigid constitutions, was absolutely representative in all its parts. The sovereignty of the States was represented in its Senate. The people were directly represented in its House of Representatives, and, for the first time in the history of government, the department of Justice was given power to pass upon the validity of laws passed by these representative bodies.

Clearly, the State which we are now describing had evolved from all the attempts at government in the past; and the one law of growth which is apparent in any broad survey of its evolution is that the State became effective in exact proportion as it recognized the individual dignity of its citizenship. The one inseparable accompaniment and evidence of the evolution of the State has been the continual uplifting and expansion of manhood as a type. This has been and is the supreme result and test of State growth. "A government is to be judged," says John Stuart Mill, "by its tendency to improve the people, and by the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them." By manhood as a type, I mean the average being taken from the aggregate of every race and every clime, in every country of the world. Marcus Aurelius, standing at the threshold of the Christian era, looking forward seventeen centuries in the history of his race, said, "mankind are under one common law, and if so, they must be fellow-citizens and belong to the same body politic. From whence it will follow that the whole world is but *one* commonwealth."

Now, whatever may be said of ancient republics, of special reigns of special kings, the candid mind must see that the voice of this average man was heard loudest, and with more effect, in this new commonwealth, than it had elsewhere been heard in the history of the world. And it was listened to. From the time of the establishment of

Christianity, the voice of the priest has been substituted for that of man. The darkness of the middle centuries, and the clanging swords of war, had stifled this power of protest; but the invention of printing gave an audience to the average man; the compounding of gunpowder shortened, by making more fatal, the wars of conquest; and out of this progression of the arts and sciences emerged the man, to be accounted for in future governments. Here, in his new environment, free from misalliance with the church, disturbed by no questions of State boundaries and perplexing balances of power, the new man founded the new State, and, in token of his different *status* in the new world, he was given the ballot as his scepter.

The State, as an affirmative factor of evil interference with the man, belongs wholly to the past. The State which is to be will foster every personal right, protect every avenue of personal advancement, encourage every aspiration for personal freedom. It will gather to itself all great and noble thoughts, because it will witness the elevation of the common man. Into its complete formation will enter all lofty contemplation of the highest good to man. To its constitution all classes and conditions of mankind will contribute. Every noble endeavor, every holy instinct, and every chivalric deed of all the past, will be garnered in its perfect Statehood. It will be tolerant of human weakness, it will be helpful to human endeavor. Truth and honor will find in it an altar. Virtue will find it a shield, and vice a sword. Speech will be given audience by it. Crime will be disarmed by it. Into it will flow all gracious impulses, out of it will come all needful courage; for it will reach its perfection at a time and in an age when men shall be exactly what they seem, and the State itself shall be the auspicious symbol of the Brotherhood of Man.

JOHN A. TAYLOR.

HERBERT SPENCER AND THE LAND QUESTION.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S recent letter on the Land Question is of special interest to the advocates of "free vacant land,"—foreshadowing, as it does, the logic of their own position. It is not my purpose to offer a defense of Mr. Spencer; his works are his defense. Yet I do assert that, in principle, he has not changed his views on the Land Question.

Written as far back as 1850, the ninth chapter of "Social Statics" defines, with the clearest logic, the injustice of

private-ownership of land. This position he has ever maintained. It is true that while seeking a valid basis for the right of property, and believing that the questions raised were not likely to come to the front for many generations, he reached the conclusion that land should be owned by society as a whole. This view was greatly modified, however, when taken in conjunction with succeeding chapters of the same work, and assumed a decidedly Individualistic cast. In later works this hesitancy toward "Nationalization" has increased. Expressed in his words, "The reason for this state of hesitancy is that I cannot see my way toward reconciliation of the ethical requirements with the politico-economical requirements." Mr. Spencer's position is this: He denies the right of private ownership, and sees no alternative but "Nationalization." Recognizing, however, apparently greater evils in the latter than in the former, he lets the matter drop.

It is to be regretted that so great a thinker has not more fully developed this subject. But it must be remembered that he has doubtless been prevented from doing so on account of ill-health, together with his aversion to being drawn away from the work of completing his "Principles of Sociology."

The logic of Mr. Spencer's position is shown in the striking analogy between land and air,—illustrating the natural law which alone should govern the tenure of land. Air, which is the essential of life, must be used, but cannot be owned. It is practically unlimited, because men are unable to fence it off. Land is equally essential to life—must be used, and should not be owned. If it is true that the State of Texas could accommodate the entire population of the earth, giving every family of five persons half an acre of land, then land is practically as unlimited as air. Is it not reasonable to suppose that men will some day become wise enough to cease monopolizing the one, as effectually as Nature prevents them from monopolizing the other?

But such a result can never be reached by physical force, or governmental interference. It can only be reached through conscience and the fear of public sentiment, which will some day demand "free vacant land." The question of compensation of present owners, which Mr. Spencer said "would be a complicated one," is indeed serious when we recognize that the only alternative to private ownership is "Nationalization." But when we recognize that land should neither be owned by individuals nor by society in the abstract, and that there should be no other title than occupancy and use, then will the question of compensation become less formidable.

It may still, however, be urged that there are many who have given the equivalent of honestly earned wealth for their vacant land, and that justice demands that their claims should be recognized. Granting that this is true concerning the original purchase, plus improvements, yet what claim have they to the "increment"—a value they did not create? Or what claim have they to "interest"—a value which A. exacts from B. in proportion to B.'s helplessness, and which A. does nothing to create?

The original cost plus improvements of the vast amount of vacant land is relatively very small; and the question of compensation—so far as society is concerned—practically ceases when divested of increment and interest. It becomes, then, a question to be decided by the individuals concerned. On the one hand, will a man's conscience allow him to take, from his fellow-men, a price for land which he has no use for? On the other hand, will men pay a price for land, when other land, equally good and available, is free?

WALTER F. WELLS.

GLADSTONE AND OUR STATESMEN.

WE shall soon be called upon to vote on the questions, whether we can reduce the cost of living by reforming the tariff, and whether this reform will promote our country's welfare. This is a problem which appeals, not only to the pockets of every one who wishes to buy and sell to the best advantage, but also to the patriotism of all who wish to have our nation prosper. A valuable contribution to our knowledge of this pressing question has been made by the *North American Review*, which published last January articles from Gladstone and Blaine, and has also, in subsequent numbers, enabled us to hear from Hon. R. Q. Mills, Senator J. S. Morrill, and Hon. W. C. P. Breckinridge. Without waiting for the conclusion of this debate, I wish to call attention to some striking points.

Mr. Gladstone begins by declaring that, if America adopts free trade, she will gain a larger share of the world's commerce than even Great Britain, and both countries will be better off for it. He justifies himself in this promise, partly by telling how much all Englishmen, especially operatives, have been benefited by the abolition of protectionism in 1846, and partly by urging that the necessary tendency of protective duties is to divert capital into industries of comparatively little advantage to the nation. He argues that the interest of our people demands that we

give our main attention to those industries which yield the largest profits in proportion to the cost of production; and therefore he expresses regret that America is made to "produce more cloth and more iron at high prices, instead of more cereals and more cotton at low prices." He thus throws himself open to the charge, made by both Secretary Blaine and Senator Morrill, that he is recommending a policy which would require us to give up manufacturing, and confine ourselves to agriculture.

Blaine, also, says that our country's prosperity has risen and fallen with the rates of duties at various times; that prices of steel rails and other articles have been greatly reduced by the tariff, which also enables our manufacturers to sell many classes of goods much cheaper than their British rivals can in Canada; and that Cleveland was mistaken in declaring that purchasers of products of protected industries have to "pay nearly or quite the same enhanced price which the duty adds to the imported articles." As regards this last point, I need only quote the admission of the Secretary of the Home Market Club, at their January dinner, "that protection raises prices as compared with outside standards." If it did not, nobody would be protected. What Mr. Blaine says about the oppression suffered by colonial New England has, doubtless, had much influence over those people who consider the success of free trade and civil service reform in Great Britain sufficient reason for not allowing anything of the sort to succeed in America.

Senator Morrill resorts to similar tactics, and has much to say about Gladstone's sympathy with Secession, the Opium War, Ireland, the State Church, primogeniture, and the small number of holders of land in England, as well as about the heroes of 1776. When he confines himself to the question under discussion, he says that "We are limited to a survey of the solitary British example; for no other nation treats free trade as anything better than a delusion and a snare." But the fact is that the Kingdom of the Netherlands has long enjoyed high prosperity on as free a tariff as that of Great Britain. So, too, has New South Wales, though the Senator speaks repeatedly as if this were not the case with any of the colonies. He refers to Gladstone's mention of an increase of 20 to 30 per cent. in wages under free trade, as if that was the best that could be said on that side, whereas the next line, in the statement from England, runs the per centage up to 160. He mentions, as a "dismal but inexorable sequence of the free trade system," the British practice of laying "a tax on carriages, horses, manservants, guns, and dogs," . . . "a tax on legacies and successions," etc.; but he does not try to show in what

respect these duties are more oppressive than those which we have to pay on blankets, carpets, clothing, cutlery, sugar, and almost every other necessary of life. The growers of wheat, corn and cotton are kindly informed that, "Our present exports of these articles operate adversely upon our agricultural interests," as if the farmers who send the least produce to market are the best off. In trying to show that "Protection produces the best work," he mentions many really valuable facts, like these: "American locomotives are received in Australia, New Zealand, South America, and elsewhere, as equal to any in the world, and as cheap. Some British manufacturers stamp their cotton-goods with American trade-marks, because similar American goods, wherever known, fetch the highest price. House-furnishing and saddlery hardware, locks, joiners' tools, watches, silverware, jewelry, paper of all kinds, and many other articles of American manufacture, are often both superior to and cheaper than similar articles produced abroad." Substantially the same is said about our agricultural implements, carriages, and sewing-machines; and it is also stated that we have "more of the natural aptitudes for the widest fields of manufactures than can be claimed even for the people from whom we sprang." To this testimony may be added that of Secretary Blaine, as to our ability to sell boots and shoes, leather goods, carpets, pianos, many kinds of hardware, and various other products of our factories, in Canada.

If our factories are really so far as this beyond competition, they do not need to be protected against it: all that is necessary is to increase the number of cases, like those mentioned by Blaine and Morrill, as just quoted, in which our manufacturer either gets his raw materials free of duty, as is still the case with hides and cotton, or else pays but little for them in proportion to the value of the product.

Senator Morrill's article is followed by one in which the president of the Pennsylvania Steel Company is quoted as saying, "Give me free ore, and I'll sell pig-iron in Liverpool, and send steel rails to London"; and a glass-maker, named Macbeth, has declared that, with free raw materials, he could defy the world. Many of the woolen manufacturers in New England make no secret of the fact that, if wool were only on the free list, they could get along without protection; and at least one of our leading makers of hardware, Mr. Sargent, is a vigorous opponent of our tariff. If other manufacturers still stand up for it, this is not because they need to protect themselves against Britishers, but because they want to go on making two or three times as large a profit out of their fellow-citizens at home,

as they find amply sufficient abroad. Shovels, for instance, were sent from Massachusetts to Mexico, a year or two ago, and sold at one-half the price charged in the United States.

Mr. Mills, in his answer to Secretary Blaine, says: "With the facts as he states them — and they are correct — there can be no justification for keeping any taxes on these articles." . . . "If we take the tax off the raw material, we will add woolens, cotton, iron and steel, and many other kinds of manufactures, to our exports." . . . "And if we could increase our exports to Canada, and hold her markets against our foreign rivals, could we not hold our home markets, when the foreigner would have to pay the cost of reaching us before he could compete?" In reply to the Secretary's arguments from American history, his Texan antagonist brings forward many decisive facts. For instance, during seven years of free trade, ending with 1860, our national wealth increased 66 per cent.; but during seven years of protection, closing with 1881, the increase was 30 per cent. Under free trade again, the agricultural States gained in wealth at the rate of 24 per cent. a year between 1850 and 1860; but it was only 5 per cent. in these same States between 1870 and 1880 under high tariffs. The manufacturing States, including Massachusetts, found, during the same periods, protection only one-half as lucrative as free trade. Our greatest increase in agricultural products, at any time, has been the 95 per cent. between 1850 and 1860. The gain in manufacturing products at the same time was 85 per cent.; but from 1860 to 1870 it was 80 per cent., and from 1870 to 1880 only 59. Our foreign trade increased during fourteen years of low tariffs, beginning in 1846, 200 per cent.; but it has gained only 23 per cent. during the fourteen years of high tariffs, ending with 1888.

The importance of the last item is due to a fact, emphasized by Mr. Mills but sadly ignored by protectionists,— namely, that our trade with England benefits both parties. "We can produce much that she wants better and cheaper than she can, and she can produce much that we want better and cheaper than we can; and the exchange is beneficial to both. Our vast system of manufactures stands on the same solid and immovable foundation as our agriculture. There are few things in either that we cannot produce cheaper than they can be produced elsewhere; and that article whose cost of production is the lowest holds the market against all competitors." We have such advantages in soil, climate, skill and intelligence of farmers, and labor-saving machinery, that our agricultural labor is more productive than that of any other people. "Some years ago we exported bread-stuff and provisions largely to European markets on the continent. That trade is now almost de-

stroyed by hostile tariffs, in retaliation for our prohibitions against their manufacturers." . . . "We have to-day twelve millions more people than we had in 1881; and yet our exports of agriculture are 230 millions less than they were that year." . . . "If we would open our markets to the products of other countries, ours would be taken in exchange for theirs. But as long as we refuse to take their surplus, they cannot take ours, because they have nothing else with which to pay." Our farmers need foreign markets; and so do our manufacturers; for these latter "can turn out a third more product than our people can consume; and we must either have more markets and more consumers, or less products, less employment, less wages, and less profits to capital." . . . "We are shut out from the world's markets, because the cost of our production is greater than that of our rivals"; but we could "produce better and cheaper, more than half the products which the manufacturing people of Europe are distributing through the world, if we could obtain the materials at the same cost." . . . "With cost of production brought to the lowest point by removal of all taxes on materials going into manufacture, we should soon recover our lost position as carrier of the world's commerce."

Here Mr. Mills comes out, fair and square, on the real question at issue. The contest, this Spring, is on letting hides, ores, wool, and other raw materials come in free of duty. Other protectionist countries allow this advantage to their manufacturers; and why should not ours? Hides, for instance, have been free for eighteen years; and the result is that we are now able to send ten million dollars' worth of leather a year to Europe, to export large quantities of boots, shoes, and leather goods, to supply the wants of our people at low rates, and to pay high wages to operatives. If the present attempt to tax hides succeeds, cost of production will increase, our foreign trade in leather, shoes, etc., will be lost, as is generally agreed by business men; domestic consumption will also be effected, fewer laborers will be employed in tanneries and shoe-shops, wages will fall, prices of everything made of leather will rise, and every American will be a loser, with the exception of a few rich men who run great slaughter-houses. Wool, again, is taxed; and our manufacturer is compensated by a special duty which is levied on all imported woolens according to their weight, and which thus falls most heavily on the buyers of the cheapest goods. This weight-tax is not intended for his protection; for that is secured by another tax, adjusted according to value. No one is trying to take off this protective duty from woolens, but attempts have been made to remove the tax from wool and also the compensatory duty according to weight. The Mills Bill, with

its provisions to this effect, was one of the issues in 1888. If this change is made, our manufacturer will remain protected just as thoroughly as before, but he will be able to turn out cheaper goods, — to sell more of them at home, and to send large quantities to markets now closed against him; the increased demand for labor in our factories will raise wages; prices of woolens, worsteds, flannels, etc., will fall; the need of mixing American with foreign wool will save our wool-growers from loss; and these benefits are sure to come, because they did actually follow the remission of duties in 1857. The case of iron-ore is substantially the same. With free raw materials would come greater prosperity, higher wages, and cheaper goods.

The relation of wages to tariffs will form the subject of my next article; and I must here call attention to what is said, in the April number of the *Review*, by Mr. Breckinridge, about the fact that when a manufacturer is forced by competition to produce as cheaply as possible, he finds it necessary to employ the best labor within reach," because the greatest skill produces not only the best article but the most of it." Thus free competition calls for the best workman at the highest wages; as is the case in Great Britain, where operatives are paid much better than in protected France, Germany, and Italy. Mr. Breckinridge also urges that the sum of $37,558,720, now annually collected as duty on materials which are absolutely needed in our factories and could not be raised or produced in America, "is a direct protection paid to the foreign manufacturer and workman to help them exclude our workmen from the markets of the world." If our factories were relieved from this burden, they would turn out more goods at lower prices; and to do this, they would have to employ more operatives, at higher wages. We are increasing every year our imports of woolens, so that they now cost us more than $50,000,000, annually; but all the money which is paid for making those goods would go into the pockets of American operatives, if wool were on the free list.

The gentleman from Kentucky also shows that there are now very few skilled workmen among our immigrants; that our country would have been bankrupt if our farmers had been satisfied with the home market; and that our government has no legitimate right to impose taxes for the purpose of protecting particular industries against competition. The plea, that we are growing rich under this system, was, he says, urged with equal justice by the defenders of slavery; and an opponent of prohibition has recently published an article, asserting that "The prosperity of any city or section could be accurately measured by the number of the saloons."

F. M. Holland.

INSINCERITY IN RELIGION.

A FRIEND belonging to a church called "evangelical" told me that he really believed one thing which he had heard from a Unitarian minister: namely, that it was useless for Unitarians to contend with an Orthodox man by quoting from the Bible, since on that ground the latter could "beat the former out of their boots every time." My friend seemed entirely unaware that the Unitarian also could find scripture texts wherewith to entrench himself.

It is curious and instructive to notice how diverse and incompatible with each other are the doctrines which are claimed as proved true, and thus as obligatory rules of life, by the citation of texts of scripture. Not only Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Orthodox Congregationalists and Episcopalians think their peculiarities authorized and established by this method, but Unitarians, Universalists, Quakers, Shakers, Dunkers, Spiritists, Christian Scientists and Mormons use the same method with the same success. Every one of them can find, in advocacy of his peculiarity, some saying of some writer in that library called The Bible.

We have all heard the proverbial saying that the Bible is a fiddle upon which any tune may be played. Whether this saying originated with a scoffer or a careful and intelligent reader, it is obviously true. Among the sixty writers (more or fewer) whose works have been brought together to constitute that book, all varieties of opinion may be found, corresponding to the intelligence or want of intelligence of the period, the nation, and the individual writer. That such differences should exist was not only natural and inevitable, but is an instructive fact which will show even to the wayfaring man (when some future revision of the Bible shall have arranged the books of the Old and New Testaments in the order in which they were written) the progress of thought, inquiry and intelligence in the successive centuries during which those books were written. But when the authorities in Church and State claimed that collection of books as unitary in character, and as so divinely inspired as to constitute a sufficient and infallible rule of doctrine and practice, binding upon the consciences of all men, some curious results necessarily followed. It was impossible that uniformity of belief should be produced by a book containing two religions, with rules and doctrines so diverse that the devotee of one must be converted before joining the other, and moreover with diversity between some of the writers of each Testament amounting not infrequently to direct opposition. Nobody could possibly believe at once the whole of Judaism and

the whole of Christianity. But, belief in both being despotically enjoined by both Church and State, men submitted to the law, and selected from the heterogeneous mass of Scripture, as their particular rule, those portions which authorized their own peculiarities of doctrine and practice. The consequence is that we have now in this country two sets of Roman Catholics, four of Episcopalians, twelve of Methodists, eight of Baptists, six of Presbyterians, and three of Congregationalists, all appealing to the same Bible as their authority, and each jealous of and at variance with the others.

A still worse result of this state of things is the mental and moral confusion necessarily resulting from the pretense of believing things obviously incompatible with each other. We have all heard of the joke of the Englishman, just admitted to "Holy Orders," who, when asked whether he found no difficulty with the Thirty-nine Articles, said he should not have minded if there had been forty. But there is a serious aspect to the matter, which is well illustrated by the very interesting memoir of William George Ward, published last year, showing his connection with the Oxford movement. Mr. Ward, a very devout member of the Anglican church, felt it his duty to become a preacher of the Gospel. The church would not allow him to preach it without signing the Thirty-nine Articles. Examination of the Articles showed him, incontestably, not only that they taught two diverse doctrines, one Anglican, one Roman, but that in spirit these two were not only different but absolutely contradictory. He concluded to solve the difficulty by subscribing "in a non-natural sense," that is to say, in a sense contrary to their obvious meaning. And he openly maintained his right to do so.

The shocking inconsistency of such a preliminary as this to the work of "preaching the gospel" is intensified in this case by the deliberateness of the proceeding. It has often been discussed whether morality and religion are identical, or whether either of them includes the other. Mr. Ward's case shows an immoral act prompted expressly by religious motives. The deliberate vindication of such a course is rare, but the action itself is one of the commonest in those churches which require subscription to a long-established creed. A creed has been defined as a mark put in to show the place where men stopped thinking. Every elaborate creed made a hundred years ago is likely to contain something which increasing intelligence has outgrown. But these formularies of belief, assumed in the beginning to be scriptural, and therefore certainly correct, and assumed ever since to be sanctified and made permanent by that conformity with scripture, have now to meet

the calamity of the crumbling of their corner-stone, scripture itself being proved in several respects untrustworthy. Even before this discovery had reached the public at large, vehement disputes as to the true meaning of scriptural passages had formed the variety of sects and subdivisions of sects above-mentioned. Ever since the time of Calvin and Luther, these divisions have been growing more numerous; and now, the knowledge diffused by critics and religious people outside the churches has compelled the authorities inside to recognize the difficulties of their situation, and to try some remedial measures. Hence the movements towards "revision of the standards," which are not only occupying but convulsing the great church establishments.

As William George Ward made no secret of the "non-natural" character of his subscription, but rather paraded it polemically before his fellow-churchmen, his attitude, however unveracious, was not uncandid. But when our Andover Professors go on repeating, every five years, their certificates of allegiance to a creed material portions of which they are known to disbelieve and have notoriously ceased to teach, they not only falsify as Ward did, but commit the further dishonesty of pretending, and asserting, and elaborately arguing that they still hold the beliefs and fulfil the obligations in question.

Can such manifest insincerity exist and continue in one department of human life without extending to others? John W. Chadwick tells us that "If we are contemptuous of truth in our devotions, we shall very shortly be contemptuous of it in all the various business of our lives." From such a cause, is not such an effect inherently probable? If such things are openly done by professionals in the department called sacred, can we wonder if it abounds in the departments called secular?

It is not our Orthodox friends only who trangress in this matter. As long as Unitarians set up in their churches or chapels permanent or occasional crosses, they necessarily imply, to the orthodox majority around them, participation in the belief of the latter that the death of Jesus is a matter of deeper significance than his life of teaching and example. As long as they celebrate, on the 25th of December, the birth of the Christ of Hebrew prophecy in Bethlehem of Judea, they necessarily imply, to the orthodox majority around them, participation in the belief of the latter in that tradition, though Jesus (whom they erroneously call "Christ") did not fulfil that function, and was probably born neither at that time nor in that place. As long as they perform an elaborate ceremonial in celebration of Easter Sunday, and sing anthems declaring a resur-

rection of Jesus from the dead on that day, and place before their Sunday-school children the conspicuous motto, "He is Risen," and teach them to sing hymns assuming that such a resurrection actually occurred, will not such object-lessons have more power to mislead those children than rational verbal explanations can have to set them right? Why do not Unitarians separate themselves from complicity in a superstition which acts effectively in arresting mental development among a vast majority of our people? Why do they not show by deed as well as word their conviction that a dead body is absolutely and permanently dead, and that the soul, or actual person which does not die, has no need to rise again?

The celebration of Easter by a few people as merely a joyful welcoming of Spring, in continuation of a pre-christian custom, seems harmless enough when viewed by itself; but if a vast number around them are celebrating it because they really believe the false theology which it represents and perpetuates, the case is materially altered. If the minority use the same symbols and mottoes and anthems as the real believers in what those things signify, the tendency must naturally be to strengthen the superstitions in question.

CHARLES K. WHIPPLE.

THE BASIC REASON FOR SOCIAL REFORM.

IN one of the many Social Science Clubs that of late have sprung up in Boston — themselves one of the signs of the times — a series of half-a-dozen lectures on Taxation has just been given: one Saturday on Massachusetts' tax-laws, another on Income-taxes, another on the Single Tax, and, last of all, Socialism as the End of all Taxation.

This theme is truly worth some consideration. It is not sufficiently acknowledged that we have really two kinds of governors,— public and private,— and that the one kind increases as the other decreases. Yet it is a fact of considerable importance. Every Society needs government, whatever Anarchists may say; — not necessarily of a restraining character, but administering, directing; and the more Society progresses, the more complicated it becomes, the more administration it evidently needs. This is a sufficient refutation of the political motto, "the Society least governed is best governed." The facts are these: that as the public authority loses its importance and power, our private masters, employers, capitalists, bankers, take its place along the whole line, and, being so very interested in keeping

possession, they induce public opinion and the newspapers, by arts in which they are adepts, to sanction the above motto.

For, observe, they make themselves well-paid for the "trouble" of governing. As the public authorities are supported by taxes, so our private ones are supported — ay, pampered — by what have very properly been called *Fleecings*, to wit, Profits, Interest, and Rent. Interest will disappear under a Socialist *regime;* but profits and rent will, to a certain extent, and in a certain form, be maintained,— though turned into the public coffers, thus making taxation, technically so-called, superfluous. Socialists, however, in this connection, claim, in opposition to Henry George, that rents alone will not suffice for public purposes.

But, however important a matter, the change of private masters into public functionaries is not an end, but simply a means.

Another matter, intimately connected with this, has equally been altogether too much magnified and made virtually into the whole contents of Socialism,— to wit, that the fleecings above mentioned are wages, robbed from labor, and that Socialism simply consists in restoring them to the manual workers, thus giving them the fruit, and the whole fruit, of their work. This, in a nutshell, is German Socialism. It is thus one-sided; first, because it was the working-classes among whom almost all agitation was conducted, and who naturally felt the pinch caused by the palpable defects in our systems of distribution; and next, because the German mind, like the French, but wholly unlike the Anglo-Saxon, is an eminently logical mind, and only needs to have its attention directed to what is illogical, and, with the more reason, to what is unjust, in order instantly to condemn it and work for its abolition. Such arguments, on the other hand, have not the remotest effect on the practical Anglo-Saxon, unless the abolition is seen to be practicable; unless, at the same time, something to put in the place of the evil to be abolished is shown.

No, the great basic reason for social reform is something more comprehensive, something that not only appeals to but constrains all classes, "all men of good-will." It is, as I take it, nothing else than Morality. Morality is a force,— the mightiest force in humanity. Again, it is an end, the end which it undoubtedly is the object of man's life-work here on earth to accomplish: the organic unity of mankind,— the fellowship and brotherhood of men. As a force it is the outcome of the order already existing in the world: the empire of necessity, of benevolent necessity, to which we all must submit. And yet I believe that Free-will is a fact, too, but with very great limitations.

To do an act from our free will really means consciously and voluntarily to co-operate with this empire of necessity, this world-*order*.

There is one opinion, among others, in that thought-breeding volume, "Ethical Religion," by Wm. M. Salter, which I think mistaken — and, by the way, it is a mistake that may have vast practical consequences. It is there said that Morality is a natural law, like that of gravitation, but with this immense difference, that the latter acts necessarily, the former not. If this latter be true, why! Morality would not be a law at all. But I think the two are precisely on the same footing. Why does gravitation now always act? Because the *conditions* are always present. But take the law of expansion: we precisely can utilize that law as extensively as we do in our locomotives and steamships, because we can control the conditions, and because when the conditions are at hand the law always acts. Apply this to Morality, as a force. Mr. Salter is right that it is not now active, or active as it should be — for then we should have a perfect Society. But is not this the reason,—that the conditions, the *data*, are not ready?

This is just man's work *now*: to bring about these conditions, which involve both economic and intellectual changes. When we once have them, I am as convinced that Morality will work as surely as gravitation, as I am that the sun will rise to-morrow. Then we shall do our duty spontaneously, not from obligation; then we shall love our fellow-men as naturally as we now love our near friends.*

LAURENCE GRONLUND.

*It is to show what these data are, how to bring them about, and how Morality as a *force* will issue in Morality as an *end*, that is the object of my essay, "Our Destiny," lately begun as a serial in the *Nationalist* magazine. —L. G.

FATALISTIC SCIENCE AND HUMAN SELF-DETERMINATION.

V. RATIONAL DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARY MOVEMENTS.

MODERN Science is out and out fatalistic. Its interpretation of natural phenomena leaves no room for spontaneity of action. Self-determination of any sort is rigorously excluded from its scheme as utterly incompatible with leading principles. All motion, and therewith all change in Nature, being looked upon as a mechanically determined result of outwardly transmitted energy, the initiation and direction of motion from within is uncompromisingly antagonistic to such a state of things, and would indeed at once fatally upset it.

May it then be clearly understood, by all who care for logical consistency, that the principle of the mechanical transfer of energy or motion from mass to mass, from particle to particle, which has governed physical science since Newton's time, necessarily implies an irreversible, uncontrollable happening of natural occurrences. From the very beginning of things, by dint of the primordial cast of the world-constituting material, all following changes, together with their so-called developments, must in that case have been undeviatingly predetermined in every slightest particular.

Pressed by these inexorable necessitarian implications of the mechanical conception, modern philosophy, since Descartes, has essentially consisted in the effort to harmonize, through some more or less rational explanation, the seeming freedom of our volitional performances with the absolute fatalism involved in the blind mechanism of Nature. The endeavor to render thus concordant these two diametrically opposed principles of actuation has proved, and will of course always prove, a hopeless undertaking; more hopeless by far than the often attempted and never accomplished conciliation of a surmised divine pre-ordination of events with man's moral responsibility.

If every movement in Nature is strictly the outcome of the previous mechanical disposition of the moving particles, then no mental, or so-called volitional, effort of ours can possibly cause any particle thus moved to deviate in the least degree from its determined path. And, as all our actions consist in bodily movements, they likewise must in every instance be altogether mechanically determined, must result, independently of any volitional exertion on our part, as a mere physical outcome of the general laws of motion. If, on the other hand, there are movements in Nature which originate from the spontaneous outflow of energies belonging to the substance or being that constitutes the moving body, then the mechanical nexus of outwardly imparted impulsions is thereby forcibly overcome by inwardly arising modes of activity, and with it ends the universal sway of the scientific conception of the conservation and equivalent transfer of energy.

Never can we get to understand human nature as an indiscerptible whole so long as we indulge in the weakness of adhering on the scientific side to the necessitarian view, while on the moral side we are attributing libertarian aims to our actions. The main task of philosophy is rationally to harmonize all parts of our experience. Rationalism, the faith we go by, the superstition-scattering, miracle-dispelling, wisdom-promoting, justice-engendering faith of the "New Humanity" and its "New Ideal," rests confident

that Nature is not self-contradictory; that its truthful interpretation must, consequently, yield us in the end consistent and unitary knowledge.

Now, if events in the physical world, and therewith our bodily movements, are really all mechanically necessitated, it is obviously irrational to ascribe any kind of volitional freedom to them; irrational, moreover, to believe — as Determinists do — that mental motives can have a determining influence on movements thus mechanically gone through by our body, while we are under the impression of performing voluntary actions. The ever-reiterated divine miracle of the Cartesian Occasionalists, by which mental volition is made to effect bodily movements in spite of physical necessity; or the supernaturally pre-established harmony of the Leibnitzian school, by which the mental process and the physical process are made to coincide without actually influencing each other, — these are the exorbitantly fictitious devices to which consistent thought finds itself driven by the mechanical conception.

Few thinkers, however, have the intellectual vigor and courage to remain faithful to the logical implications involved in their first principles. In this respect it is instructive to notice how, on the one hand, the mechanical conception — forgetful of its purely physical bearings — has endeavored to bring perforce, under its law of equivalent and rigorously determined causation, the mental phenomena inwardly experienced as being in some way connected with volitional activity; and how, on the other hand, the inner conviction of free and spontaneous volition has sought to encroach more or less upon the will-devoid, insentient domain of inorganic Nature.

The various shades of determinism — the doctrine which ascribes efficient moving power to sundry mental states, called in consequence "motives" (Beweggründe) — are the outcome of transgressions on the part of *mechanical Causation.* Likewise the prevalent notion, that effects cannot transcend in kind and value the causes through which they issue into being; that, therefore, our time-evolved world must have an eternal cause at least as exalted as the highest and latest manifestations in Nature; that, consequently, our intellectual and moral propensities cannot fail to have as their cause an intelligent and moral originator.

Extreme instances of transgression on the part of *mental Volition* are its intrusion into what otherwise is held to be dead matter, — a view known as Hylozoism, or the doctrine of life and will-endowed atoms. And, more pretentious still, the reduction of all natural phenomena to modes of a world-creating Will, a conception subjectively

expounded by Fichte, objectively by Schopenhauer, and also extensively made use of in thelogical schemes.

The overreaching bias, in favor of mechanical causation on the one hand, in favor of free volition on the other, is what principally divides interpreters of Nature into two wholly opposed schools of thought. Those of the former persuasion endeavor under the name of Science to bring all natural phenomena, be they mental or physical, into the compass of their one law of invariable sequence. Those of the latter persuasion are bent on looking upon everything as the free ideal creation of a supreme Will. Bearing these antithetical propensities in mind, it is curious to notice how, when the thought-revolutionizing conception of Evolution was made current by Darwin and his followers, it was appropriated with almost equal eagerness by both sides. The scientists believed the way had at last been discovered by which the blind mechanism of Nature succeeds in evolving types of being wonderfully adapted to the specific conditions of their environment; — a fact apparently so out and out teleological that it had baffled the most strenuous efforts on the part of exact science to find an explanation for it in accordance with its general law of mechanical causation. The champions of free ideal volition recognized, on the contrary, in Evolution, a "stream of tendency" directed by a "power not ourselves," and making for some far-off appointed end. And the votaries of the rapidly spreading Hegelian mode of thought are pointing out with no little complacency that Evolution has long been the key-note to their conception of the world.

Is it not strange that man, in practice the most self-willed being in creation, is so ready to abdicate in theory his power of self-determination? Whenever he sets about giving a reasoned account of the impelling causes of his conduct, he almost invariably makes himself out to be acting under the spell of some uncontrollable fatality. He rejoices in pronouncing himself the impotent plaything of external conditions. And his science and philosophy, even in their latest developments, reflect this inveterate proclivity of shifting the responsibility for his doings on outside powers. First, all sorts of evil and good spirits were foiling or fostering his course. Then, though highly civilized otherwise, he would not move without propitiating his household gods or consulting the soothsayers. Later still, he makes himself believe that the stars, or an omnipotent Will, are swaying his destiny. In his scientific moods he delights in the idea that a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or, more recently, the elementary lives of his constituent cells, are performing all functions of his being. And now it is Evolution, either mechanically

or divinely ordained, that, by dint of its purely physical process of natural selection, is achieving all progress of his race. Yet, a rapturous glow will thrill his being at the account of noble deeds; and with arduous might he battles for fulfillment of his ideals!

Viewed in the light of this great perplexing contention between physical necessity and volitional freedom, there is something profoundly pathetic in the effort of serious thinkers to find some legitimate way of deliverance out of the dilemma. For rational consistency in the conception of the world, or, in other words, "search after truth," has ever been the ruling passion of philosophical minds, a sublime unrest, pining for complete accord of Thought and Being. Such importunate, ever harassing solicitude for rational consistency is especially noticeable in Kant's philosophical career. On the one hand a firm believer in the validity of the Newtonian science and its universal law of mechanical causation, nay, a firm believer in the necessary causative sequence of all natural events; on the other hand deeply imbued with faith in a supersensible, immortal Self, bearing from its spiritual home along into this world of physical occurrences the stern command of a moral law to be imposed upon Nature by human conduct; — swayed by these two opposite views of actuation in Nature, he labored with life-long assiduity to discern in the depths of our rational being the bond by which they are in reality united. Believing in the existence of a supernatural, "intelligible" world; a world constituted by eternal reason, in which human reason is in verity rooted,— his chief endeavor was to harmonize this intelligible world with the sense-given, natural world. His profound meditation led him at last to look upon the sensible world, appearing to us in Time and Space, as itself rendered coherent and significant by intellectual processes. Still, even then, the life of human beings — evolved from moment to moment in this sensible world as the effect of antecedent conditions — seemed to him wholly governed by the law of necessary causation. He could detect no scope for volitional freedom in a sequence of events in which every occurrence is strictly the outcome of a previous state of things. If my present action is the natural and fully determined effect of the foregoing state of my being and the definite set of influences that constitute its environment, how can a volitional command, issued when such activity is in the course of inevitably following from its determining causes, in any way interfere with its necessitated outcome?

If a volitional command were capable of interrupting and changing *ad libitum* the necessary sequence of specifically determined effects upon specifically determined causes,

then the natural disposition of our organization, with its inherited characteristics and educational modifications, would count for nothing in our conduct. Every instant of our lives we would be free and able to perform any action lying within the sphere of volitional possibility. The inwrought propensities of our constitution would nowise obstruct the boundless liberty to act as we causelessly resolved. And the full dependence of natural occurrences on an unbroken enchainment of previous causes once overcome, it would be hardly far-fetched to expect anything to happen at any time independently of what had occurred before. Mountains might then possibly move at our mere bidding.

Kant adhered throughout to complete Determinism in Nature. Yet, at the same time, he remained unfalteringly convinced of the free causative power of our moral nature, of the power in us to control the course of events in obedience to moral injunctions. But in what way could he possibly conceive these two opposite modes of causation, the necessitarian and the libertarian mode, to coincide in the determination of one and the same action?—this was, and still is, the gist of the problem. In the "Critique of Practical Reason," written when Kant was over sixty years old, he makes his final attempt to unify volitional freedom with what he calls the "mechanism of Nature." He sees only one way out of the dilemma. He declares that actions are free only when determined by our intelligible, noumenal, supernatural Self, which is nowise limited by time and space-conditions. These same actions, when they come to appear in the sensible world of Time and Space, are found incorporated in the mechanism of Nature.

Readers, who have paid little attention to the philosophical interpretation of our moral nature will probably find this kind of out-of-the-way solution of our great problem unworthy of being seriously considered. But it is highly important, for whoever cares to gain some insight into the groundwork of Ethics, to understand correctly Kant's point of view, because it has become essentially the point of view of all Nature-transcending thinkers; of most thinkers, indeed, who uphold volitional freedom against the fatalistic Determinism taught at present by the Naturalistic school of thought. It is the point of view of the late Professor Green—the teacher of Robert Elsmere—and of his numerous followers, many of whom are occupying Philosophical Chairs in English and American universities.

Let us then listen to some of Kant's own sayings, in order to catch rightly the bent of his thought. He says; "The moral law imposes imperatively upon rational beings the task of imparting to the world of sense, manifest as

sensible Nature, the form of an intelligible world, i. e., of a *super-sensible Nature*; and this without abrogating the mechanical order." He thinks that, as beings belonging to the intelligible or supernatural world, in which moral reason has its eternal fulfillment, we are free. As beings belonging to the sensible or natural world, the free moral determination of our rational will appears in the medium of our time-bound perception as forming part of the necessary causative sequence of events. "Were we endowed with intellectual vision we would perceive the entire enchainment of natural appearances, so far as they are determined by moral law, to be depending on the spontaneous freedom of the Subject as thing-in-itself, of whose determining power no physical explanation can be given."

It is the eternity-scattering influence of Time, which seems to Kant to entangle our free volitional determination in the necessitarian vortex of Nature in general. He can conceive no solution of the problem of freedom and necessity if our innermost being does not dwell in a region transcending the world of Space and Time. "If that which determines the existence of things in Time be taken also to determine their existence as things-in-themselves, then the necessity attaching to natural causation can in no way be reconciled with freedom of action; the two principles are in that case contradictory. For, according to natural causation, every event, and, consequently, every action occurring at a certain moment of time, is necessarily determined by what has happened the moment before. And, as that which has elapsed does not stand under my control, every action which I perform must occur with necessity from causes which lie beyond my control; i. e., the moment I am acting I am never free."

It is, however, especially in the following sentence that Kant gives the cue to the doctrine of rational moral causation adopted by his idealistic followers: "The difference between the natural order, where the will is subject to Nature, and the moral order, where Nature is subject to the will, lies in the fact that in the former instance objects are the cause of the presentations which determine the will; in the latter instance Reason itself is the cause of the objects which determine it."

Now, if Reason is really endowed with the power of constituting objects that determine our Will, of constituting indeed all morally desirable objects, then it is clear that the world which we morally strive to realize is one which is entirely constituted by Reason; and the sense-apparent world, in which we find ourselves at present involved, has its existence only in a deficiency of rational power, attaching to our individual being. This, in fact, is the consistent

outcome of the Kantian doctrine of the object-constituting efficacy of Reason. And it is the strange esoteric view of existence taken by transcendental Idealism. To the adherents of this philosophical creed Reason is the one eternal Reality. All the rest illusion.

The transcendent part which Kant made Reason play in the drama of life,— Reason, not the meretricious handmaid of selfish and sensual desires, that cunning twist of ours that takes its "license in the halls of time"; but pure, divine Reason, that summons our sense-absorbed being with imperative call to fulfil the eternal decrees of the Moral Law,— this energy-rousing appeal to the self-determining power in us proved its practical potency by exerting a marvelously bracing influence on German patriotism, when expounded by Fichte in his "Orations to the German Nation."

The vast progress which Rationalism and Science had made in the modern mind is apparent in the fact that our conception of the transcendent objects of religious faith, God and Immortality, was reduced in the Kantian philosophy to dependence on the actual existence of morality among us. If not attested by morality, nothing else in Nature seemed to Kant to point in that direction,— not efficient nor final causation.

But does morality itself really depend on something supernatural in us? or can we, after all, by help of our amplified means of knowledge, find a naturalistic explanation for it? Let us try.

EDMUND MONTGOMERY.

[*To be concluded.*]

GENERAL TOPICS.

ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE F. R. A.

THE Annual Convention of the Free Religious Association will be held at Tremont Temple in Boston on Wednesday, May 28. The morning session will be devoted to the general subject of the Moral and Personal Elements in Social Reform, and the afternoon session to the Opening of the Eastern Nations to Western Influences. The list of speakers will be a strong one, and will be duly announced in the newspapers. There will be the usual dinner in the Meionaon in the evening, with addresses. The Annual Business Meeting of the Association will be held in Social Hall, Tremont Temple, on Thursday morning, May 29, at ten o'clock.

UNITARIANISM AND SCIENCE.

We have examined eagerly each successive issue of the *Christian Register*, since the publication of our April Magazine. Four numbers of it have been printed since we propounded to it our simple yet earnest query, suggested by its editorial, which we quoted. But the *Christian Register* is wise in its generation. Doubtless it has nothing to say, and is cautious enough, therefore, not to try to say it.

We quote again what we quoted before — from the *Christian Register* of March 13:

> In our thought and feeling, Unitarianism is simply the name that means our highest conceptions of religious truth, the truest, freest, and best possible interpretation of the Christian religion, in the light of modern science and modern thought; and this is why we are loyal to the name.

What a text for a far-reaching sermon! And if space and time here permitted, what a wonderful sermon might be from such a text — all modern thought to give of its best to full-round it — and manifesting altogether, and how ably, the strength and beauty of mankind's New Ideal!

But alas! Unitarianism *is not* what the text claims for it. The *Christian Register* is truly wise not to pursue the matter. Unitarianism still means miracle, and an authoritative Bible, and a personalized deity, and petitional prayer, and a specially endowed saviour, and contentment with a selfishly competitive Society, and a myriad other things which "in the light of modern science and modern thought" have long become absurdities, wrongs, and detriments. Things better there are, to-day, than any of these ancient holdings,— things which "modern science and modern thought" have *really* shown us. *Some day* there will be the religion which, heartily and joyfully, shall accept and preach the better things, letting all the past crude things go — but there is no such religion yet. Shall that religion be "Unitarian" religion? No, nor Roman nor Evangelical religion. It shall be religion without any limiting adjective whatever. It shall be *Religion* — universal, upbuilding, out-leading — normal human life under Nature's normal forces of good. It shall be abundance and virtue and brotherhood.

A WOOD-CHOPPER ON THE SOCIAL QUESTION.

One of the most earnest of the subscribers to and believers in The New Ideal is certainly entitled to the following expression of opinion. And that opinion should be taken for what it is worth; for although the writer, in another portion of his letter, speaks of himself as a "wood-chopper," he without doubt has here no axe to grind:

> "The New Ideal is very interesting, and I am especially delighted with the articles of Mrs. Dietrick and Mr. Powell. I

have been tempted to write you an article on the 'Other Side,' showing the *true cause* of Poverty, which I, from fifty years' observation, feel certain rests far more on vice, vanity, imbecility, and lack of true economy, than on any favoritism of bosses or unjust laws. The Sage of Concord says,

> 'Property will *brutely* draw,
> Still to the *proprietor* ;
> Silver to silver creep and wind,
> And kind to kind.'

It is very evident to me that all men and women are not born natural proprietors ; — and, give them all the chance in the world, they will always be poor in material things. 'The poor ye have always with you.' 'Tis the order of Nature, and no man-made laws or structure of Society can make it otherwise. What would Mr. Hadley say to those innumerable cases (ten to one of those cited by him in the April Magazine) where John is well-off and independent, on less wages than James has all his life ?

"The accumulation of wealth rests fully as much on ability to spend wisely, as on ability to earn ; and we often see good, noble and whole-souled people who are always poor from this cause. This is not the greatest cause, however, by any means ; for I am certain that nine-tenths of the poverty that has come under my observation rests on pride and the sensual vices.

> 'What can ennoble sots, and slaves, and cowards ?
> Alas! not all the blood of all the Howards.'

And not any possible change in material conditions. When I hear reformers attributing the most of our ills to Society, I am reminded of what Thoreau said on visiting Chamberlain Lake, where he found two or three families forty miles from settlements. 'These could no longer accuse Society, but must face the true source of evil.'

"I am in sympathy with the *workers*, for I am of them. But in fighting for them I want to be sure to 'face the true source of evil,' and not waste my ammunition. I could say much more in this direction, but I forbear — we all want the Truth. THE NEW IDEAL gives us a chance to exchange thought, and thus live larger lives by knowing our fellows better."

A MINISTER WHO HAS BEEN A WORKINGMAN.

DOUBTLESS a number of correspondents will be eager to dispatch, in our next issue, the writer of the above letter. Touching the reference to Mr. Hadley's April paper, we may quote below how the same article struck another — one also qualified to speak — a Liberal clergyman in Canada :

"Mr Hadley's article in your last number, 'The Modern Way of "Getting There,"' gave exactly my experience as a workman. There are of course exceptions, but what he says is most often the rule. I worked in one large industrial establishment in England where this toadyism was carried on. If one wanted a recommendation for a 'raise' in pay, 'treat' the foreman when you met him in the evening, and you would get it ; or if he were a Sunday-school man, go to his school and become a teacher. Furthermore, should he become familiar with your wife, it would mean a raise of pay if you did not notice his familiarity. Work honestly, however, and toady to no one, and you would soon be recommended for discharge.

"My short experience as a workman in the States told me

matters there stood much the same. I remember that the 'pet man' of a certain foreman once told me he got into the foreman's favor, by telling him an indecent 'funny' story. This system of toadyism in large establishments literally robs men of everything that is noble and manly in their nature.

"Please continue to send me your Magazine. I like the tone of its articles, *although I am a parson.*"

In this connection the recent expression of the Omaha *World-Herald* will be read with interest.

"The Modern Way of 'Getting There'" is a more dignified article than its title would lead one to suppose. It is a truthful and simple statement of the position of the workman who is so unfortunate as to have his wages paid him by a large corporation. Politics, which form so large a part of the tyranny exercised by men over men, and which men so seldom write about, are shown in this article in their true and damaging relation to labor.

CREED OR LIFE.

No more interesting or valuable lecture has appeared in the entire series of *The Modern Science Essayist* than Mr. Kimball's "Evolution of Arms and Armor." The author's treatment of the subject is not confined by any means to "war and the wager of battle, weapons and the wounds of conflict," but in an admirable and entrancing way grasps all of ancient and modern life — vegetal and animal and social, moral and religious and political. We have space here for this fragment of it:

The lesson, however, does not stop with statesmanship. Religion is a field where precisely the same principle is at issue. What are creeds, forms and great ecclesiastical systems but the outward armor in which men have sought to protect the inward spirit of religion? What are many of the churches and denominations of the past but monsters of the theologic ages, rivaling those of geology in their fierceness? What the rack, the stake, the thumb-screw, the inquisition, and, later, all the awful imagery of eternal suffering, but the teeth and claws and jaws of the old brute-world reappearing on earth in subtler and sharper forms? Their use has no doubt been honest and natural; their hardness and cruelty have been thought a necessary means of defending and perpetuating their inside truth. But how futile they have been! How many of the old dogmas are now as dead as the old brutes! How certain are all the institutions and all the churches, whose trust is in any outward letter or outward form, sooner or later also to go! And for the same reason,— the use of their vitality in the wrong direction; the impossibility of anything thus hardened to adjust itself to the world's ever-changing spiritual climate, and the pressure at last on their believers, under the effort to make them ever stronger and stronger against their foes, of their own dead weight. On the other

hand Christianity itself lives, the great spirit of all religion lives, because an element within it has always acted on the other principle,— refused from the start, as with Jesus, to encase itself in any words or forms, used its Divine food for inward growth, adapted itself to the world's progress, and relied, when assailed, for its real defense, on the inner weapons of reason, spiritual insight and the power of truth. When religion first started, ages since, from form to faith, from outward authority to inward insight, and from one vast body to a multitude of little sects, it did indeed seem, from the ecclesiastical standpoint, as great a mistake as when the animal kingdom branched off from a shell to a back-bone, and from a Megalosaur to a Microlestes. But the wisdom which has been vindicated of her children in the kingdom of animals will just as surely be vindicated of them in that of spirit. And if the friends of religion want to defend it most effectively of all, is it not plainly along the line of its interior development, rather than along that of building it into creeds and fortifying it with logic, that their work should be done?

BOOK NOTES.

The Bible; Analyzed, Translated and Accompanied with Critical Studies, by Rev. Leicester A. Sawyer. Introduction. Whitesboro, N. Y.: L. A. Sawyer, 1889. Pages, 56. Price, 20 cents.

This pamphlet announces a new version which is to "improve the chapter divisions in both Testaments" and "abandon the antique style of common English Bibles for the better style which has superseded it in current literature." How thorough will be the change may be judged from the fact that we are to say Jeve instead of Jehovah. The Introduction is mainly occupied with an account of the dates and authors of different books of the New Testament. Paul is very properly said to have written only Romans, Galatians, First and Second Corinthians, and First Thessalonicans, usually called Thessalonians. The claim of priority for Mark's Gospel is strong and probable; but the supposition that neither this book nor the Revelation was written before the year 140 is not sustained by the best authorities, who give the year 70 of the present era as the probable date of both works. Copies of pamphlets about the Apocalypse, and other parts of the Bible, may be obtained of Mr. Sawyer. F. M. H.

The Twentieth Century, New York, $2.00 a year. The best number of this periodical ever printed is its latest number—the issue of April 24. Besides the always pungent paragraphs of Mr. Pentecost, there is, in this issue, the particularly delightful sarcasm of the associate editor, on the new New York "Christian" Riverside Tenement houses, to be let on "business principles"; and there follow a special article by Col. Ingersoll, on "Crumbling Creeds," an extended poem by Edgar Fawcett, two articles on Protectionism and Free Trade by Mr. Denslow and Professor Sumner, Mr. Pentecost's usual discourse, a story of laboring poverty by Hagan Dwen, and Correspondence and Notes. If the *Twentieth Century* could always be like this it would quickly leap to fame. Its editor justly speaks of "this splendid number."

The Rostrum, Jamestown, N. Y., weekly, 8 pages, $1.00 a year. Rev. Henry Frank's new venture, giving his weekly discourse, accompanied by editorial articles on current themes, and followed by general contributions, has reached its sixth number, and certainly grows better with each issue. In religion Mr. Frank is well-known as an ardent Independent; in economics he is of the forward look,—his paper stands "as a bold and fearless advocate of Justice, Right and Truth, in defiance of all biases and conventionalities ancient and modern,"—and as a whole the periodical will doubtless easily make a place for itself. Mr. Frank especially seems disposed to one commendable virtue, which by far the majority of "reformers" lack—tolerance, generosity to fellow-workers, a willingness to recognize good in other lines than his own. This is admirable, and a prophecy of the future.